Abstract. In this paper, we show two new constructions of chosen ciphertext secure (CCA secure) public key encryption (PKE) from general assumptions. The key ingredient in our constructions is an obfuscator for point functions with multi-bit output (MBPF obfuscators, for short), that satisfies some (average-case) indistinguishability-based security, which we call AIND security, in the presence of hardto-invert auxiliary input. Specifically, our first construction is based on a chosen plaintext secure PKE scheme and an MBPF obfuscator satisfying the AIND security in the presence of computationally hardto-invert auxiliary input. Our second construction is based on a lossy encryption scheme and an MBPF obfuscator satisfying the AIND security in the presence of statistically hard-to-invert auxiliary input. To clarify the relative strength of AIND security, we show the relations among security notions for MBPF obfuscators, and show that AIND security with computationally (resp. statistically) hard-to-invert auxiliary input is implied by the average-case virtual black-box (resp. virtual grey-box) property with the same type of auxiliary input. Finally, we show that a lossy encryption scheme can be constructed from an obfuscator for point functions (point obfuscator) that satisfies re-randomizability and a weak form of composability in the worst-case virtual grey-box sense. This result, combined with our second generic construction and several previous results on point obfuscators and MBPF obfuscators, yields a CCA secure PKE scheme that is constructed solely from a re-randomizable and composable point obfuscator. We believe that our results make an interesting bridge that connects CCA secure PKE and program obfuscators, two seemingly isolated but important cryptographic primitives in the area of cryptography.
that some non-black-box construction exists). Our new constructions based on (multi-bit) point obfuscators do not seem to be covered by this negative result, and thus it could serve as a new target for building CCA secure PKE.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we show two new constructions of CCA secure PKE schemes from general assumptions, using the techniques and results from program obfuscation [3] . We actually construct CCA secure key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) [30] , where a KEM is the "PKE"-part of hybrid encryption that encrypts a random "session-key" for symmetric key encryption (SKE). By combining a CCA secure KEM with a CCA secure SKE scheme, one obtains a CCA secure PKE scheme [30] . The key ingredient in our constructions is an obfuscator for point functions with multi-bit output (MBPF obfuscators) [57, 23, 33, 44, 25, 7] , that satisfies a kind of average-case indistinguishabilitybased security in the presence of "hard-to-invert" auxiliary inputs. The formal definition of this security notion will be given in Section 3. For brevity, we call it AIND security. Our first construction in Section 4.1 is based on a CPA secure PKE scheme and an MBPF obfuscator satisfying the above mentioned AIND security in the presence of computationally hardto-invert auxiliary input. Our second construction in Section 4.2 is based on a lossy encryption scheme [6] and an MBPO satisfying the above mentioned AIND security in the presence of statistically hard-to-invert auxiliary input. Interestingly, the first and the second constructions are in fact exactly the same, and we show two different security analyses from different assumptions on building blocks. These two constructions add new recipes into the current picture of the constructions of CCA secure PKE schemes/KEMs from general assumptions.
In order to clarify where these AIND security definitions for MBPF obfuscators are placed, in Section 5 we show that AIND security with computationally (resp. statistically) hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs is implied by the (average-case) virtual black-box property [3] (resp. virtual greybox property [7] ) in the presence of the same auxiliary inputs. Besides these, we show the relations among several related worst-/average-case virtual black-/grey-box properties under several types of auxiliary inputs, and summarize them in Fig. 2 , which we believe is useful for further research on this topic and might be of independent interest.
Finally, in Section 6, we show that a lossy encryption scheme can be constructed from an obfuscator for point functions (point obfuscator) that satisfies re-randomizability [7] and a weak form of composability [57, 23, 7] in the worst-case virtual grey-box sense. This result, combined with our second generic construction and the results on composable point obfuscators with the virtual grey-box property in [7] , shows that a CCA secure PKE scheme can be constructed solely from a point obfuscator which is re-randomizable and composable.
We believe that our results make an interesting bridge that connects CCA secure PKE and program obfuscators, 1 two seemingly isolated but important cryptographic primitives that have been separately studied in the area of cryptography, and hope that our results motivate further studies on them.
Overview of Techniques
Our proposed constructions of KEMs are based on the "witness-recovering" technique [64, 66, 61, 51] in which a part of randomness used to generate a ciphertext is somehow embedded into the ciphertext itself, and is later recovered in the decryption process for checking the validity of the ciphertext by re-encryption. What we believe is novel in our constructions is how to implement this mechanism of witness-recovering by using an MBPF obfuscator with an appropriate security property.
Let I α→β denote an MBPF such that I α→β (x) = β if x = α and ⊥ otherwise, and let MBPO denotes an MBPF obfuscator which takes an MBPF I α→β as input, and outputs an obfuscated circuit DL for I α→β . ("DL" stands for "digital locker," the name due to [23] .) Let Π = (PKG, Enc, Dec) be a PKE scheme, where PKG, Enc, and Dec are the key generation, the encryption, and the decryption algorithms of Π, respectively. Below we give a high level idea behind our main proposed constructions in Section 4 (and in Appendix E) by explaining how the "toy" version of our constructions Π ′ = (PKG ′ , Enc ′ , Dec ′ ), constructed using Π and MBPO, is proved CCA1 secure based on the assumptions that Π is CPA secure and that MBPO satisfies the virtual black-box property with respect to dependent auxiliary input [43] . (As mentioned earlier, in this paper we actually construct KEMs rather than PKE schemes, but the intuition for our results are captured by the explanation here.) A public/secret key pair (P K, SK) of Π ′ is of the form P K = (pk 1 , pk 2 ), SK = (sk 1 , sk 2 ), where each (pk i , sk i ) is an independently generated key pair by running PKG. To encrypt a plaintext m under P K, Enc ′ first picks a random string α ∈ {0, 1} k (where k is the security parameter) and two randomness r 1 and r 2 for Enc, and computes a ciphertext C in the following way:
Enc(pk 1 , (m∥α); r 1 ), Enc(pk 2 , (m∥α); r 2 ), MBPO(I α→(r 1 ∥r 2 ) )
) ,
where "∥" denotes the concatenation of strings, and "Enc(pk, m; r)" means to encrypt the plaintext m under the public key pk using the randomness r. To decrypt C, we first decrypt c 1 by using sk 1 to obtain (m∥α), then run DL(α) to recover (r 1 ∥r 2 ). Finally, m is returned if c i = Enc(pk i , (m∥α); r i ) holds for both i = 1, 2, and otherwise we reject C. Here, it should be noted that due to the symmetric roles of pk 1 and pk 2 and the validity check by re-encryption performed in Dec ′ , we can also decrypt C using sk 2 , so that the decryption result of C using sk 1 and that using sk 2 always agree. Now, recall the interface of a CCA1 adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ), where A 1 and A 2 represent an adversary's algorithm before and after the challenge, respectively. A 1 is firstly given a public key P K, and can start using the decryption oracle Dec ′ (SK, ·). After that, A 1 terminates with output two plaintexts (m 0 , m 1 ) and some state information st that is passed to A 2 . A 2 is given st and the challenge ciphertext C * = (c * 1 , c * 2 , DL * ) which is an encryption of m b (where b is the challenge bit), and outputs a bit as its guess for b.
The key observation is that A 2 can be seen as an adversary for the MBPF obfuscator MBPO, by regarding (st, c * 1 , c * 2 ) as an auxiliary input z about the obfuscated circuit DL * of the MBPF I α * →(r * 1 ∥r * 2 ) . Then, if MBPO satisfies the virtual black-box property with respect to dependent auxiliary input [43] , there exists a simulator S that takes only z = (st, c * 1 , c * 2 ) as input, has oracle access to I α * →(r * 1 ∥r * 2 ) , and has the property that A's success probability (in guessing b) is negligibly close to the probability that S succeeds in guessing b. (For convenience, let us call the latter probability "S's success probability," although S is not a CCA1 adversary and thus its task is not to guess a challenge bit.) This means that if S's success probability is close to 1/2, then so is A's success probability, which will prove the CCA1 security of Π ′ .
To show that S's success probability is close to 1/2, we consider the hypothetical experiment for S in which the auxiliary input z is generated so that decryption queries from A 1 are answered using sk 2 , and both c * 1 and c * 2 are an encryption of a fixed value (say, 0 |m 0 |+k ). Since z does not contain any information on b and α * , in this hypothetical experiment S's success probability is exactly 1/2 and the probability that S makes the query α * (which is chosen randomly) is negligible. Next, we make the experiment closer to the actual S's experiment, by changing c * 1 into an encryption of (m b ∥α * ). By the CPA security regarding pk 1 , S's success probability as well as the probability of S making the query α * is negligibly close to those in the hypothetical experiment. Then, we further modify the previous experiment by changing c * 2 into an encryption of (m b ∥α * ), but this time we use sk 1 for answering A 1 's queries. Notice that this is exactly the actual experiment for S. As mentioned above, switching sk 2 to/from sk 1 for answering A 1 's queries does not affect A 1 's behavior, and thus again by the CPA security regarding pk 2 , S's success probability is negligibly close to 1/2 and the probability that S makes the query α * is negligible. Then, by the virtual black-box property of MBPO with auxiliary input, A's original success probability is negligibly close to 1/2, meaning that A has negligible advantage in breaking the CCA1 security of the scheme Π ′ .
The above completes the proof sketch of how Π ′ is proved CCA1 secure. By encrypting a random K, Π ′ can be considered as a CCA1 secure KEM. Our proposed CCA2 secure KEMs are obtained by applying several optimizations and enhancement to this KEM:
-Firstly, we do not need the full virtual black-box property with auxiliary input of [43] . As mentioned earlier, an indistinguishability-based definition in the presence of only "hard-toinvert" auxiliary input is sufficient for a similar argument to work. -Secondly, we need not include a plaintext into each of c i . Instead, we pick a randomness K ∈ {0, 1} k used as a plaintext of a KEM, and include this K into the output of the MBPF, i.e. now we obfuscate the MBPF I α→(r 1 ∥r 2 ∥K) . This is the actual basic version of our construction whose formal description and security proof are given in Appendix E. -Lastly, note that the above construction cannot be proved to be CCA1 secure as it is. In particular, the obfuscated circuit DL could be malleable. To deal with this issue, instead of the Naor-Yung-style double encryption [63] , we employ the Dolev-Dwork-Naor-style multiple encryption [35] together with the technique of the "unduplicatable set selection" [67] . Unlike the classical method of using a one-time signature scheme, in our proposed construction we employ a universal one-way hash function (UOWHF) [62] , where a hash value of DL is used as a "selector" of the public key components (for multiple encryption). Another issue is that the second stage adversary A 2 in the CCA2 experiment can also make decryption queries, and thus the above explained idea of replacing A 2 with a simulator S does not work. However, our indistinguishability-based security definition for MBPF obfuscators enables us to work with an original CCA2 adversary, and we can avoid considering how a simulator deal with the queries from A 2 . For more details, see Section 4.
Related Work: Program Obfuscation
Roughly speaking, an obfuscator is an algorithm that takes a program (e.g. Turing machine or circuit) as input, and outputs another program with the same functionality, but otherwise "unintelligible." After the impossibility of general-purpose program obfuscation satisfying the nowadays standard security notion called virtual black-box property shown in the seminal work by Barak et. al. [3] , several subsequent works extended the impossibility in various other settings [43, 70, 46, 7] . The other line of research pursues possibilities of obfuscating a specific class of functions. Before 2013, most known positive results were about obfuscation for point functions and their variants, e.g. [57, 70, 23, 27, 7] . Relaxing the security requirements to "average-case" in which a program is sampled according to some distribution, several more complex tasks have been shown to be obfuscatable, such as proximity testing [34] and cryptographic tasks such as re-encryption [52, 28] and encrypted signatures [47] . The goal of these works was obfuscation itself, while our work uses a positive result on obfuscation of (multi-bit) point functions as a tool to construct other cryptographic primitive. One of the previous works which has the same spirit as ours is the work by Bitansky and Paneth [9] who showed how to construct a three-round weak zero-knowledge protocol for NP, which is known to be impossible via black-box simulation, using a point obfuscator and an MBPF obfuscator as a part of building blocks. In fact, our work is partly inspired by their use of point obfuscation. We note that the security required for obfuscators in our proposed construction is weaker than one used in [9] to achieve their weak zero-knowledge protocol.
Since the first candidates of a cryptographic multilinear map have been proposed in 2013 [37, 29] , the research field of (cryptographic) obfuscation has drastically changed and accelerated. Brakerski and Rothblum [17] showed how to construct an obfuscator for conjunctions from graded encoding schemes [37, 29] , and the same authors showed a further extension [18] . Most recently, they showed a general-purpose obfuscator satisfying a virtual black-box property in an idealized model called the generic graded encoded scheme model [19] . Barak et al. [2] studied obfuscation for a class of functions called evasive functions which in particular includes point functions. A series of works [39, 68, 53, 38] (and many other recent works) have shown that a general-purpose obfuscator satisfying a security notion weaker than the virtual black-box property, called indistinguishability obfuscator [3] , which seems to be too weak to be useful, is in fact surprisingly powerful and can be used as a building block for constructing a various kinds of cryptographic primitives. Garg et al. [39] constructed the first candidate of general-purpose indistinguishability obfuscation. A security notion stronger than indistinguishability obfuscation, called differing-inputs obfuscation [3, 1] (and its closely related notion of extractability obfuscation [15] ), has also been shown to be quite powerful and useful [1, 15] .
Among a number of recent fascinating results, especially relevant to our work is the work by Sahai and Waters [68] who showed (among several other primitives) how to construct CCA secure PKE and KEMs from an indistinguishability obfuscator (and a one-way function). Although our work and [68] have the common property that both works build CCA secure PKE using techniques and results from obfuscation, our use of obfuscators and that of [68] are quite different: We use an obfuscator for a specific class of functions, point functions and MBPFs, while [68] uses an obfuscator for all polynomial-sized circuits. Furthermore, the indistinguishability-based security notion for MBPF obfuscators used in our main result is about randomly chosen MBPFs, while that used in [68] is for the worst-case choice of circuits (that compute the same functions). We would also like to stress that our work and [68] were done concurrently and independently.
Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 (and Appendix A) we review the basic notations and definitions of primitives. In Section 3, we introduce the formal definitions of our new indistinguishability-based security notions for MBPF obfuscators. In Section 4, we show our main results: two CCA secure KEMs using an MBPF obfuscator. In Section 5, we investigate relations between our new security notions and other notions for MBPF obfuscators. In Section 6, we show how to construct a lossy encryption scheme from a point obfuscator with re-randomizability and composability. In Section 7, we discuss some issues on the MBPF obfuscators that we use.
Preliminaries
In this section, we review the basic notation and the definitions for lossy encryption and (cryptographic) obfuscation. The basic notation and the definitions for standard cryptographic primitives that are not given in this section are given in Appendix A, which include PKE, KEMs, UOWHFs, as well as other basic primitives.
Basic Notation. N denotes the set of all natural numbers, and if n ∈ N then [n] = {1, . . . , n}. "x ← y" denotes that x is chosen uniformly at random from y if y is a finite set, x is output from y if y is a function or an algorithm, or y is assigned to x otherwise. If x and y are strings, then "|x|" denotes the bit-length of x, and "x∥y" denotes the concatenation x and y. "x ? = y" is the operation that returns 1 if x = y and returns 0 otherwise. "PPTA" stands for a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. If A is a probabilistic algorithm then y ← A(x; r) denotes that A computes y as output by taking x as input and using r as randomness. A O denotes an algorithm A with oracle access to O. A function ϵ(k) : N → [0, 1] is said to be negligible if for all positive polynomials p(k) and all sufficiently large k ∈ N, we have ϵ(k) < 1/p(k). Throughout this paper, we use the character "k" to denote a security parameter.
-(Statistical lossiness) For all computationally unbounded algorithms A and for all sufficiently large k ∈ N it holds that Adv (k) except that the public key pk is generated as pk ← LKG(1 k ). We call ϵ lossiness.
Obfuscation for Circuits and Worst-Case Security Definitions
Here, we recall the definition of circuit obfuscations, following the definitions given in [3, 57, 43, 8] . In the following, by C we denote an ensemble {C k } k∈N , where C k is a collection of circuits whose input length is k ∈ N and whose size is bounded by some polynomial of k.
Definition 2. We say that a PPTA Obf is an obfuscator for C if it satisfies the following:
-(Functionality) For every k ∈ N and every C ∈ C k , a circuit output from Obf(C) computes the same function as C. -(Polynomial blowup) There exists a polynomial p = p(k) > 0 such that for every k ∈ N and every C ∈ C k , the size of a circuit output from Obf(C) is bounded by p(k).
Note that the above definition is only about the functionality requirements of obfuscators. Next, we recal the security definitions for "worst-case" choice of circuits.: The virtual black-box property is due to Barak et al. [3] , the virtual black-box property with auxiliary input is due to Goldwasser and Kalai [43] , and virtual "grey"-box (with auxiliary input) is due to Bitansky and Canetti [7] . Note that in the above definitions, the simulator S can depend on the polynomial q which represents the hardness of obfuscation. Wee [70] refers to the simulators of this type as a "weak simulator." We also define (t-)composability of obfuscations [57, 23, 7, 25] . Following [8] , we only define the composability in the grey-box (WVG) notion, using a computationally unbounded simulator, which is sufficient for our purpose in this paper.
Definition 4.
( [7] ) Let t = t(k) > 0 be a polynomial. We say that an obfuscator Obf for C satisfies t-composability, if for every PPTA A and a positive polynomial q, there exists a computationally unbounded algorithm S that makes only polynomially many queries, such that for all sufficiently large k ∈ N and for all circuits C 1 , . . . , C t ∈ C k , it holds that:
where the probabilities are over the randomness consumed by Obf, A, and S.
Notations for Point Obfuscators and MBPF Obfuscators. Let X be a finite set, t ∈ N, α ∈ X , and β ∈ {0, 1} t . A point function I α and a multi-bit point function (MBPF) I α→β are functions defined as follows:
We refer to α and β as the point address and the point value, respectively. In this paper, we will only consider circuits for computing point functions/MBPFs with the properties that (1) the description is given in some canonical form and thus there is a one-toone correspondence between a point address/value and the circuit for computing the point function/MBPF, and (2) the description of the circuits reveals the point address/value in the clear. Hereafter, we will identify a point function and an MBPF with circuits that compute them (with the above mentioned properties).
For an ensemble X = {X k } k∈N , where each X k is a set, we denote by PF(X ) the ensemble of point functions {I α } α∈X k . Similarly, for X and a polynomial t, we denote by MBPF(X , t) the ensemble MBPFs {I α→β } α∈X k ,β∈{0,1} t .
Hereafter, we refer to an obfuscator for point functions as a point obfuscator and will denote it by PO. Furthermore, we refer to an obfuscator for MBPFs as an MBPF obfuscator and will denote it by MBPO. Moreover, we call an ensemble X = {X k } k∈N a "domain ensemble" (for point functions and MBPFs) if (1) for all k ∈ N, each element of X k is k-bit, (2) |X k | is superpolynomially large in k (and thus 1/|X k | is negligible), and (3) we can efficiently sample an element from X k uniformly at random.
Concrete Instantiations of a Composable Point
Obfuscator and an MBPF Obfuscator. In Appendix B, we recall the concrete construction of a point obfuscator due to the results [21, 7] , which is originally proposed by Canetti [21] as a perfectly one-way function and is later shown to be t-composable under the t-strong vector Diffie-Hellman (t-SVDDH) assumption, which is a stronger variant of the DDH assumption. There, we also recall the construction of an MBPF obfuscator based on a composable point obfuscator [23, 7] .
New Security Definitions for MBPF Obfuscators
In this section, we introduce and formalize the new security notions for MBPF obfuscators that we call average-case indistinguishability w.r.t. (computationally/statistically) partially uninvertible auxiliary input, which will play a central role in our proposed KEMs given in Section 4. This security definition requires that obfuscated circuits of MBPFs hide the point values on average, even in the presence of "dependent" auxiliary inputs [43, 33] , as long as the auxiliary input has some "hard-to-invert" property.
In the following, we formally define what we mean by "hard-to-invert" auxiliary input in Section 3.1. Then, in Section 3.2, we define the new indistinguishability-based notions. (Looking ahead, we will show the relations between the new security notions with the virtual black-/grey-box security notions in Section 5.)
For notational convenience, in this section, X will always denote a domain ensemble {X k } k∈N , and t = t(k) > 0 be a polynomial that will be used for MBPF obfuscators for MBPF(X , t), and do not introduce them in each definition.
Auxiliary Input Functions and Partial Uninvertibility
For MBPF obfuscators, we will consider the average-case security in the presence of "dependent" auxiliary input [43] that depends on the description of an MBPF I α→β being obfuscated. We will capture this by a probabilistic function ai that takes as input the point address/value pair (α, β) ∈ X k × {0, 1} t . Furthermore, we consider the (average-case) "partial uninvertibility" of the function ai. That is, given z output by ai(α, β) for a randomly chosen (α, β), it is hard to find α. We consider computational and statistical partial uninvertibility. 1] , and let ai : X k × {0, 1} t → {0, 1} * be a (possibly probabilistic) two-input function. We say that ai is a δ-computationally (resp. δ-statistically) partially uninvertible auxiliary input function (δ-cPUAI (resp. δ-sPUAI) function, for short) if (1) it is efficiently computable, and (2) for all PPTAs (resp. computationally unbounded algorithms) F and for all sufficiently large k ∈ N, it holds that Adv 3 where the experiment Expt P-Inv ai,F (k) is defined as follows:
Furthermore, we say that ai is ℓ-bounded if the output length of ai is bounded by ℓ = ℓ(k).
Average-Case Indistinguishability of Point Values with Auxiliary Input
In our proposed KEM constructions, what we need for an MBPF obfuscator is that it hides the point value "on average," in the presence of auxiliary input that is simultaneously dependent on the point address and the point value. This indistinguishability-based definition, formalized below, enables us to avoid using simulator-based security notions, and helps to make the security analyses of our proposed constructions simpler. 
In the experiment, DL stands for a "digital locker" (the name is due to [23] ).
The following is a simple fact that in order for the new definitions to be meaningful, δ has to be a negligible function. 
Chosen Ciphertext Security via MBPF Obfuscation
In this section, we show our main results: two constructions of CCA2 secure KEMs. The first and the second constructions are given in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. We also explain several extensions applicable to our proposed constructions in Section 4.3.
First Construction
Let Π = (PKG, Enc, Dec) be a PKE scheme with the plaintext space {0, 1} k , the public key length ℓ PK (k), the randomness length ℓ R (k), and the ciphertext length ℓ C (k) (where the definitions of these are given in Appendix A. We define
be a domain ensemble such that each element in X k is of length k, and let MBPO be an MBPF obfuscator for MBPF(X , t). Furthermore, let H = (HKG, H) be a UOWHF. Then we construct a KEM Γ = (KKG, Encap, Decap) as in Fig. 1 .
Useful Properties of Γ . To show the CCA2 security of the proposed KEM Γ , it is useful to note the following two simple properties, which are both due to the validity check of a ciphertext by reencryption performed in the last step of Decap (and the correctness of the underlying PKE scheme Π). The first property states that in order to generate a valid ciphertext, an obfuscated circuit DL cannot be copied from other valid ciphertexts. (The formal proof is given in Appendix D.2.) Lemma 2. Let (P K, SK) be a key pair output by KKG(1 k ), and C = (c 1 , . . . , c k , DL) be a ciphertext output by Encap(P K). Then, for any ciphertext
Parse P K as ({pk
Parse SK as ({sk
The second property is the existence of the "alternative" decapsulation algorithm AltDecap. 
, c ℓ ) in the fifth step, instead of executing Dec(sk
Regarding AltDecap, the following lemma is easy to see due to the symmetric role of each of sk 
CCA2 Security of Γ . The security of Γ is guaranteed by the following theorem. Fig. 1 is CCA2 secure.
Theorem 1. Assume that Π is ϵ-CPA secure with negligible ϵ, H is a UOWHF, and MBPO is AIND-δ-cPUAI secure with δ(k) ≥ kϵ(k). Then, the KEM Γ constructed as in
Basic ideas for the proof of this theorem are explained in Section 1.3. Thus, we directly proceed to the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1. We will show that for any PPTA adversary A attacking the CCA2 security of the KEM Γ , there exist PPTAs B h and B o and a (kϵ)-cPUAI function ai Γ :
where Π k is the k-repetition construction of the underlying PKE scheme Π (see Section C for the explanation on it). Combined with our assumptions on the building blocks and Lemma 7 (stated in Appendix C), this inequality implies that Adv AltDecap( SK h * , C), where SK h * is the alternative secret key corresponding to (P K, SK) and
Same as Game 4, except that DL * is replaced with an obfuscation of the MBPF I α * →β ′ with an independently chosen random value β ′ ∈ {0, 1} t . That is, the step "DL * ← MBPO(I α * →β * )" in Game 4 is replaced with the steps "β ′ ← {0, 1} t ; DL * ← MBPO(I α * →β ′ )." (Note that each r * i and K * 1 are still generated from β * .)
, let Succ i be the event that A succeeds in guessing the challenge bit (i.e. b ′ = b occurs) in Game i. Using the above notation, A's CCA2 advantage can be calculated as follows:
In the following, we show the upperbounds of the terms that appear in the right hand side of the above inequality.
Proof of Claim 1. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let DLColl i be the event that A submits at least one decapsulation query C = (c 1 , . . . , c k , DL) such that DL = DL * and Decap(SK, C) ̸ = ⊥. The difference between Game 1 and Game 2 is how A's decapsulation query C = (c 1 , . . . , c k , DL) satisfying DL = DL * is answered, and these games proceed identically unless DLColl 1 or DLColl 2 occurs in the corresponding games. Hence, we have
Thus, it is sufficient to show the upperbound of Pr[DLColl 1 ]. Moreover, recall that according to the rule of the CCA2 experiment, A 2 's queries C = (c 1 , . . . , c k , DL) must satisfy C ̸ = C * , and thus if DL = DL * , then it must be the case that (c 1 ,
Then, by Lemma 2, for any decapsulation query C by A 2 satisfying DL = DL * , we must have Decap(SK, C) = ⊥. This means that A 2 's queries are answered identically in both Game 1 and Game 2.
Therefore, to show the upperbound of Pr[DLColl 1 ], it is sufficient to show the upperbound of the probability that A 1 makes a query that causes the event DLColl 1 . Instead of directly considering the event, we show the upperbound of the probability that A 1 makes a decapsulation query that contains DL * . (Clearly, if A 1 does not make such a query, then no query made by A 1 causes DLColl 1 .) However, it is easy to see that in Game 1, the probability that A 1 makes a decapsulation query that contains DL * is at most q/|X k |. (This holds even if A 1 is computationally unbounded.) This is because in order for A 1 to make such a query, it is at least necessary that A 1 succeeds in guessing the randomly chosen point value α * ∈ X k , without seeing any information on α * . (Note that if DL * is an obfuscation of the MBPF I α * →β * for some α * and β * , then DL * cannot be an obfuscation of another MBPF I α→β with α ̸ = α * .) Therefore, the probability (over the choice of α * ∈ X k and the choice of A's internal randomness) that DL * is contained in one particular decapsulation query made by A 1 is exactly 1/|X k |. By the union bound over all of A 1 's possibleueries, the probability that A 1 makes a decapsulation query containing DL * is at most q/|X k |.
In 
Proof of Claim 3. For i ∈ {2, 3}, let HColl i be the event that A submits at least one decapsulation 
We show how to construct a PPTA adversary B h that attacks the universal one-wayness of H with the advantage Adv
) is as follows:
1} t uniformly at random, and computes DL * ← MBPO(I α * →β * ). Then B h1 prepares the state information st B consisting of all information known to B h1 , and terminates with output (DL * , st B ). B h2 (st B , κ): B h2 generates a key pair (P K, SK) in the same way as KKG(1 k ) does, except that B h2 uses the hash-key κ that it receives as a hash-key in (P K, SK).
, and also chooses b ∈ {0, 1} and K * 0 ∈ {0, 1} k uniformly at random. Then, B h2 runs A 1 and A 2 as Game 3 runs (which is possible because B h2 holds SK). When A 2 terminates, B h2 checks if
If such query is found, then B h2 terminates with output DL. Otherwise, B h2 simply gives up and aborts.
The above completes the description of B h . It is easy to see that B h does perfect simulation of Game 3 for A, and whenever A makes a query that causes the event HColl 3 , B h2 can find such a query and output a colliding value DL satisfying H κ (DL) = H κ (DL * ) and DL ̸ = DL * . Therefore, we have Adv
. Then, by the inequality (4), we have Adv
This completes the proof of Claim 2.
⊓ ⊔
Proof of Claim 3.
It is sufficient to show that the behavior of the oracle given to A in Game 3 and that in Game 4 are identical. Let C = (c 1 , . . . , c k , DL) be a decapsulation query that A makes. If To this end, we need to use the AIND-δ-cPUAI security of the MBPF obfuscator MBPO. We therefore first specify the auxiliary input function that we are going to consider. Define the probabilistic function
where the randomness used by ai Γ is the randomness for executing PKG for k times. Note that ai Γ is efficiently computable. The following claim guarantees that ai Γ is computationally partially uninvertible.
Proof of Claim 4. As noted above, ai Γ is efficiently computable. We will show that for any PPTA F which runs in the experiment Expt
Once this is shown, by using the ϵ-CPA security of Π and Lemma 7 we have that for any PPTA F and for all sufficiently large k ∈ N, it holds that Adv
To show the above, fix an arbitrary PPTA F that runs in Expt
Then B p1 prepares the state information st B consisting of all information known to B p1 , and terminates with output
The above completes the description of B p . Let b be the challenge bit for B p . B p 's CPA advantage can be estimated as follows:
Consider the case when b = 0. It is easy to see that in this case, B p perfectly simulates Expt
is an encryption of M 0 = α for a uniformly chosen α, and the randomness r * i used for generating c * i is also chosen uniformly by B p 's experiment (recall that the experiment Expt
Under this situation, the probability that α ′ = α occurs is exactly the same as the probability that F outputs α in Expt
When b = 1, on the other hand, each c * i in z is an encryption of M 1 = 0 k , and thus z is completely independent of α. Therefore, α is information-theoretically hidden from F. This must mean that in this case, the probability of F outputting α is exactly
In summary, we have Adv 
← pk i and runs (pk
B o then picks γ ∈ {0, 1} and K * 0 ∈ {0, 1} k uniformly, and sets 
Consider the case when b = 0 (i.e. DL * is computed as DL * ← MBPO(I α→β 0 )). Note that by the definition of the experiment Expt
as α * and β * in Game 4, respectively, then the values in z (i.e. {pk i } i∈ [k] which are used as {pk
, and the value K * which is used as K * 1 ), are generated/chosen in exactly same way as those in Game 4. Therefore, since γ is chosen randomly by B o , the challenge ciphertext C * = (c * 1 , . . . , c * k , DL * ) and the challenge session-key K * γ for A is distributed identically to those in Game 4 in which the challenge bit for A is γ. Moreover, decapsulation queries from A are answered by using AltDecap( SK h * , ·), as is done in Game 4. Hence, B o simulates Game 4 perfectly for A in which the challenge bit for A is γ. Under this situation, the probability that γ ′ = γ occurs is exactly the same as the probability that A succeeds in guessing the challenge bit in Game 4, i.e.
Next, consider the case when b = 1. In this case, DL * is computed as DL * ← MBPO(I α→β 1 ), where β 1 is also chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} t , independently of β 0 . Under this situation, if we regard α, β 0 , and β 1 in Expt
is generated in such a way that it is distributed identically to that in Game 5 in which the challenge bit for A is γ, and thus B o simulates Game 5 perfectly for A in which the challenge bit is γ. Therefore, with a similar argument to the above, we have Pr
In summary, we have Adv Proof of Claim 6. This is obvious because K * 1 , which is contained in β * , is independent of the challenge ciphertext C * , and the distribution of K * 1 and that of K * 0 are exactly the same in Game 5. Therefore, the distribution of the challenge ciphertext/session-key pair (C * , K * b ) as well as all other values (public key P K and the responses to decapsulation queries) are identically distributed in both cases b = 0 and b = 1. This must mean that the probability that A succeeds in guessing the challenge bit is exactly 1/2. This completes the proof of Claim 6.
⊓ ⊔ Claims 1 to 6 and the inequality (2) guarantee that there exist PPTAs B h and B o , and a (kϵ)-cPUAI function ai Γ satisfying the inequality (1), as required. Recall that the choice of the PPTA CCA2 adversary A was arbitrarily, and thus for any PPTA CCA2 adversary we can show its negligible advantage. Hence, Γ is CCA2 secure. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Second Construction
In the first construction shown in the previous subsection, we used an ordinary CPA secure PKE scheme for Π. Now, we consider the construction of the KEM Γ in which Π is replaced with a lossy encryption scheme. Π now has the lossy key generation algorithm LKG, and thus is of the form Π = (PKG, Enc, Dec, LKG). (The lossy key generation algorithm LKG is actually not used in the construction, and is used only in the security proof.) Because of this change, we can now relax the requirement for the MBPF obfuscator MBPO to be secure in the presence of only statistically partially uninvertible auxiliary input. This result is captured by the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Assume Π is an ϵ-lossy encryption scheme with negligible ϵ, H is a UOWHF, and
MBPO is AIND-δ-sPUAI secure with δ(k) ≥ kϵ(k). Then, the KEM Γ constructed as in Fig. 1 is CCA2 secure.
The proof proceeds very similarly to that of Theorem 1, and the main difference is that we introduce an additional game between Game 4 and Game 5 (in the proof of Theorem 1) for switching the public keys {pk
Proof of Theorem 2. We will show that for any PPTA adversary A attacking the CCA2 security of the KEM Γ , there exist PPTAs B h , B ℓ , and B o , and a (kϵ)-sPUAI function ai
where Π k is the k-repetition construction of the underlying lossy encryption scheme Π (see Section C). Combined with our assumptions on the building blocks and Lemma 8 (stated in Appendix C), this inequality implies that Adv 
is generated by the lossy key generation algorithm LKG, where h * i is the i-th bit of h * = H κ (DL * ). Note that the corresponding secret keys {sk
} i∈ [k] are not at all used in Game 5 (in fact they are already not required in Game 4), and thus this game is well-defined. Game 6: Same as Game 5, except that DL * is replaced with an obfuscation of the MBPF I α * →β ′ with an independently chosen random value β ′ ∈ {0, 1} t . That is, the step "DL * ← MBPO(I α * →β * )" is replaced with the steps "β ′ ← {0, 1} t ; DL * ← MBPO(I α * →β ′ )." (Note that each r * i and K * 1 are still generated from β * .)
For i ∈ [6] , let Succ i be the event that A succeeds in guessing the challenge bit (i.e. b ′ = b occurs) in Game i. Using the above notation, A's CCA2 advantage can be calculated as follows:
Claim 8 There exists a PPTA
The proofs of these claims are identical to those of Claims 1, 2, and 3 in the proof of Theorem 1, respectively, and thus omitted.
Claim 10
There exists a PPTA B ℓ such that Adv
Proof of Claim 10. We show how to construct a PPTA distinguisher B ℓ that has the claimed advantage in distinguishing ordinary/lossy keys of the k-repetition lossy encryption scheme Π k . B ℓ is given as input P K ′ which is output from either
, and runs as follows:
, 1} k and γ ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random, and then runs
The above completes the description of B ℓ . Let b be the challenge bit for B ℓ . B ℓ 's advantage in distinguishing ordinary/lossy keys can be estimated as follows:
Consider the case when b = 0 (i.e. P K ′ given to B ℓ is generated from PKG k ). Then it is easy to see that B ℓ perfectly simulates Game 4 for A in which the challenge bit for A is γ. Under the situation, the probability that γ ′ = γ occurs is exactly the same as the probability that A 2 succeeds in guessing its challenge bit in Game 4, i.e. Pr[γ ′ = γ|b = 0] = Pr[Succ 4 ].
When b = 1 (i.e. P K ′ given to B ℓ is generated from LKG k ), on the other hand, it is also easy to see that B ℓ perfectly simulates Game 5 for A in which the challenge bit for A is γ. With a similar argument to the above, we have Pr
where the randomness used by ai ′ Γ is the randomness for executing LKG for k times. Note that ai ′ Γ is efficiently computable. The following claim guarantees that ai ′ Γ is statistically partially uninvertible.
Proof of Claim 11. This claim is shown in essentially the same way as the proof of Claim 4, by considering not the ordinary CPA experiment but the LOS-CPA experiment regarding the k-repetition lossy encryption scheme Π k . Namely, we can show that for any computationally unbounded algorithm F that runs in the experiment Expt
(The description of B p is exactly the same as that of B p that we used in the proof of Claim 4.) Here, due to Lemma 8 and the assumption that Π is an ϵ-lossy encryption scheme, we have that Adv
Therefore, for any computationally unbounded algorithm F and for all sufficiently large k ∈ N, we have Adv ⊓ ⊔
The rest of the proof proceeds almost identically to that proof of Theorem 1. More specifically, the following claims can be shown in exactly the same way as Claims 5 and 6, respectively, and thus we omit the proofs. (The only difference is that the reduction algorithm B o uses LKG, instead of PKG, to generate {pk ⊓ ⊔
Extensions
A-priori Fixed Auxiliary Input Function. Note that for both of our constructions in Section 4, the auxiliary input functions under which the building block MBPF obfuscator MBPO needs to be secure, are dependent only on the building block PKE/lossy encryption scheme Π, which is fixed when Π is fixed. In particular, MBPO is required to satisfy AIND-δ-cPUAI (resp. AIND-δ-sPUAI) security only for t ′ -bounded δ-cPUAI (resp. δ-sPUAI) functions with
(This t ′ can be further shortened by using the technique of [36] to reduce the ciphertext size of the Dolev-Dwork-Naor construction [35] .) This a-priori bounded output length for auxiliary input functions might make it easier to achieve AIND-δ-cPUAI (and AIND-δ-sPUAI) secure MBPF obfuscators. We note that a similar observation on the possibility of weakening the requirement regarding auxiliary input by bounding its length is also given in [9] . 
Then instead of picking {r i } i∈ [k] and K ∈ {0, 1} k , these values can be generated from a short seed s ∈ {0, 1} k by β = (r 1 ∥ . . . ∥r k ∥K) ← G(s), and now we only need to obfuscate I α→s , instead of I α→β . However, this modification is at the cost of a stronger requirement for AIND-δ-cPUAI security of MBPO. That is, now δ has to be large enough to incorporate the security of the used PRG. Specifically, if the PRG is ϵ g -secure, then it is required that δ ≥ kϵ + ϵ g (where a PRG is said to be ϵ-secure if all PPTA adversaries have at most advantage ϵ = ϵ(k) in distinguishing a pseudorandom value from a truly random value for all sufficiently large k ∈ N). We note that this idea of using a PRG does not work for our second construction, because we cannot use a pseudorandom string as a randomness in the encryption algorithm of a lossy encryption scheme. Using a pseudorandomness violates the statistical lossiness property in general.
A Simpler Construction with CCA1 Security. In Appendix E, we show a simpler variant of the proposed construction which employs the Naor-Yung construction-style double encryption [63] (instead of the Dolev-Dwork-Naor-style multiple encryption), leads to a CCA1 secure KEM. (This is the construction partly explained in Introduction.) Interestingly, unlike our CCA2 secure constructions, in the proof of this CCA1 secure variant, we need to use an auxiliary input function that internally runs (a part of) a CCA1 adversary, and thus its output length cannot be a-priori bounded. (Our treatment of an adversary as a part of an auxiliary input function for an MBPF obfuscator might be of independent interest.) For more details, see Appendix E.
Relations among Security Notions for MBPF Obfuscators
In this section, we investigate the relations between our new indistinguishability-based security notions for MBPF obfuscators, AIND-δ-cPUAI/sPUAI, and the worst-/average-case virtual black-/grey-box properties in the presence of auxiliary inputs. For the average-case virtual black-/greybox properties, we consider the auxiliary input functions defined in Section 3.1, and show that our new security notions are implied by the average-case virtual black-/grey-box properties with the same type of auxiliary inputs.
Average-Case Security Definitions. We first formally define the average-case virtual black-/greybox properties for MBPF obfuscators. As in the worst-case security definitions and AIND security, for auxiliary input notions we consider the "dependent" auxiliary inputs that depend on the circuit being obfuscated (i.e. the point address and the point value in the case of MBPF obfuscation). For notational convenience, for an MBPF obfuscator MBPO, a probabilistic algorithm M whose output is restricted to be a bit, and a two-input probabilistic function ai : X k × {0, 1} t → {0, 1} * , we define the following three experiments: Furthermore, we define the (strong) average-case virtual grey-box property w.r.t. δ-computationally (resp. δ-statistically) partially uninvertible auxiliary input ((S)AVG-δ-cPUAI (resp. (S)AVG-δ-sPUAI) security for short) for an MBPF obfuscator MBPO, in the same way as the definitions for the corresponding virtual black-box properties, except that we replace "a PPTA S" in each definition with "a computationally unbounded algorithm S that makes only polynomially many queries."
Relations among Security Notions. Now, we show the relations among security notions, which are summarized in Fig. 2 . Most of the relations are obvious. Namely, the virtual black-box properties always imply the virtual grey-box properties for the same class of auxiliary inputs. Furthermore, WVB-AI security implies AVB-δ-cPUAI security for arbitrary (not necessarily negligible) δ, and AVB-δ-cPUAI security implies AVB-δ-sPUAI security because the class of δ-sPUAI functions are smaller than the class of δ-cPUAI functions for the same δ. Moreover, by definition, for both X ∈ {δ-cPUAI, δ-sPUAI}, SAVB-X and SAVG-X imply AVB-X and AVG-X, respectively, because the former notions consider simulators that do not make any oracle queries and thus can also be used as simulator for the latter.
In the following, we show the implications of the non-trivial directions. The following equivalence is due to the result by Bitansky and Canetti [7] . (Note that the following results are only for nonuniform PPTA adversaries, while our default notions in this paper are with respect to uniform PPTA adversaries.) Intuition. For both cPUAI and sPUAI cases, the implication from the latter to the former is trivial by definition. The implications of the opposite directions can be shown because the partial uninvertibility of an auxiliary input function guarantees that a simulator cannot find the point address of the MBPF being obfuscated and thus having oracle access to an MBPF does not give much advantage. The computational uninvertibility and statistical uninvertibility naturally correspond to the uninvertibility of auxiliary input functions against a PPTA simulator and that against a computationally unbounded simulator, respectively.
Lemma 4. ([7, Propositions 7.3 and A.3]) For
Finally, the following implications clarify that AIND notions introduced in Section 3.2 are indeed implied by the average-case virtual black-box/grey-box properties. (The formal proof is given in Appendix D.5.)
Lemma 6. Let δ : N → [0, 1] be a negligible function. For both X ∈ {δ-cPUAI, δ-sPUAI}, if an MBPF obfuscator is SAVG-X secure, then it is AIND-X secure.
Intuition. This lemma is shown by considering a hybrid experiment in which a (computationally unbounded) simulator S (due to SAVG-δ-cPUAI/sPUAI security) is given only an auxiliary input ai(α, β) (for randomly chosen (α, β)) as input, and outputs a bit.; By the SAVG-δ-cPUAI/sPUAI security, for both cases b ∈ {0, 1}, the probability that an adversary (attacking the AIND-δ-cPUAI/sPUAI security) on input ai(α, β 0 ) and MBPO(I α→β b ) (for randomly chosen α, β 0 , β 1 ) outputs 1 can be shown to be negligibly close to the probability that the simulator S outputs 1 in the hybrid experiment, which proves the lemma.
Lossy Encryption from Re-randomizable Point Obfuscation
In this section, we show that a re-randomizable point obfuscator yields a lossy encryption scheme. We first recall the definition of re-randomizability [7] .
Definition 8. ([7]) Let X = {X k } k∈N be a domain ensemble and let PO be a point obfuscator for PF(X ) whose randomness space is {0, 1} ℓ(k)
. We say that PO is re-randomizable if there exists a PPTA ReRand (called the re-randomization algorithm) such that for all k ∈ N, all α ∈ X k , and for all r ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , the distribution of ReRand(PO (I α ; r) ) and the distribution of PO(I α ) are identical.
We note that the point obfuscator based on the perfect one-way hash function by Canetti [21] is re-randomizable. (We review the construction in Appendix B.) Now, we formally describe our proposed lossy encryption scheme. Let X = {X k } k∈N be a domain ensemble, and let PO be a re-randomizable point obfuscator for PF(X ) with the re-randomization algorithm ReRand, and let t = t(k) > 0 be a polynomial. Then we construct a lossy encryption scheme Π = (PKG, Enc, Dec, LKG) whose plaintext space is {0, 1} t as in Fig. 3 .
Our construction is inspired partly by the construction of a PKE scheme from a re-randomizable point obfuscator due to Bitansky and Canetti [7] , and partly by the construction of lossy encryption from a re-randomizable encryption scheme due to Hemenway et al. [48] . The following theorem guarantees that Π constructed as above is indeed a lossy encryption scheme. (The formal proof is given in Appendix D.6.) Theorem 3. If PO is re-randomizable and 2-composable, then Π constructed as in Fig. 3 is a 0-lossy encryption scheme. [8] . The latter property roughly states that if a set of points (α 1 , . . . , α t ) is chosen from a distribution so that each point α i has high min-entropy (but α i 's could be arbitrarily correlated), (PO(α 1 ), . . . , PO(α t )) is computationally indistinguishable from (PO(u 1 ), . . . , PO(u t )) where each u i is chosen uniformly at random (see Appendix D.6 for the formal definition). This property can be used to show the indistinguishability of keys, which is easy to see due to the design of PKG and LKG. Moreover, note that a lossy key consists of a pair of obfuscated circuits of point functions with a same point address. Therefore, due to the re-randomizability, an encryption of any plaintext under a lossy key has identical distribution, which implies 0-statistical lossiness.
Intuition. Theorem 3 is shown by using the equivalence of t-composability and t-distributional indistinguishability for coordinate-wise well-spread (CWS) distributions, established by Bitansky and Canetti

CCA2 Secure PKE/KEM Based Solely on Re-randomizable, Composable Point Obfuscators.
Recall that when considering non-uniform PPTA adversaries, WVB security (with non-uniform PPTA simulators), WVG security, and WVG-AI security for MBPF obfuscators are equivalent (see Lemma 4) . Therefore, the WVG secure MBPF obfuscator for t-bit point values due to [23, 7] based on a (t + 1)-composable point obfuscator can be used as an AIND-δ-sPUAI secure MBPF obfuscator (with any negligible δ). Note that if we denote by ℓ the length of the randomness used by ReRand, then the randomness length ℓ R of the lossy encryption scheme Π for the k-bit plaintext space is ℓ R (k) = k · ℓ(k). Combining these results with our second generic construction, we obtain the following.
Theorem 4. Assume there exists a point obfuscator which is (1) re-randomizable where ReRand uses ℓ(k)-bit randomness, and (2) (k 2 · ℓ(k) + k + 1)-composable for non-uniform PPTA adversaries.
Then there exists a CCA2 secure PKE scheme/KEM.
Discussion
On Replacing MBPF Obfuscators with SKE. As has been clarified in several previous works [23, 33, 44, 25] , there is a strong connection between MBPF obfuscators and SKE schemes. More specifically, an MBPF obfuscator can always be used as a SKE scheme. In order for the opposite direction to be true, among other things regarding security, it is necessary that a SKE scheme has the property called the unique-key property [33, 44, 25] . (We recall the formal definition of this property in Appendix A.) Therefore, a variant of our KEM Γ in Section 4 in which an MBPF obfuscator is replaced with a SKE scheme that has the unique-key property and satisfies the security that we call AIND-δ-cPUAI (and AIND-δ-sPUAI) security (which is defined similarly to that for MBPF obfuscator), can also be proved CCA2 secure.
Since the unique-key property is not satisfied by SKE schemes in general, it may be the case that a SKE scheme is in general a weaker primitive than an MBPF obfuscator, and is potentially easier to achieve. Motivated by this observation, we show another variant of the proposed KEM based on a SKE scheme without the unique-key property. We discuss more about this in Appendix F.
On the Difficulty of Achieving AIND-δ-cPUAI Security. We have shown that AIND-δ-sPUAI security is implied by the virtual grey-box properties (see Fig. 2 ), and thus by the results established by [23, 7] we can construct an AIND-δ-sPUAI secure MBPF obfuscator (or SKE) from any composable point obfuscator. Unfortunately, however, we could not come up with a natural assumption that is sufficient to realize an AIND-δ-cPUAI secure MBPF obfuscator, and we would like to leave it as an interesting open problem. In Appendix F.3, we show that constructing it is at least as difficult as constructing a SKE scheme which is one-time chosen plaintext secure in the presence of hard-toinvert leakage where leakage occurs only from a key. We note that if the random oracle model is allowed, then the MBPF obfuscator by Lynn et al. [57] can be shown to be AIND-δ-cPUAI secure for any negligible δ. This at least suggests that it can be achieved under a strong assumption. For more details, see Appendix G. We conjecture that the MBPF obfuscator by Lynn et al. can be shown to be AIND-δ-cPUAI secure for any negligible δ if we instantiate the random oracle as a family of hash functions satisfying the notion of UCE recently introduced by Bellare et al. [5] .
We see that the difficulty of achieving AIND-δ-cPUAI security is that it allows a leakage from a random point address/value (α, β) (or a key/message pair in the context of SKE) that could be arbitrarily correlated, as long as partial uninvertibility is satisfied. This definition allows β to be (a part of) the source of the hardness of the partial uninvertibility. For example, we could consider an auxiliary input function ai(α, β) that returns an encryption of the "plaintext" α under the "key" β, using some SKE scheme, which will be a δ-cPUAI function under a reasonable assumption on the SKE scheme. This situation is quite different from a usual indistinguishability-based security definition (e.g. CPA security of a SKE scheme) in which a point value (or a message in SKE) is chosen by an adversary, and thus cannot be a source of hardness. This is one of the reasons why we cannot straightforwardly use the existing results on MBPF obfuscators/SKE [33, 25] (or a stronger primitive of PKE secure under hard-to-invert leakage [32, 16] ). We notice that the formulation of AIND-δ-cPUAI security looks close to the security definition for deterministic encryption in the hardto-invert auxiliary input setting [20, 72, 73] , which considers leakage from a plaintext (as opposed to a key). This setting is in some sense a "dual" of the settings that consider leakage occurring only from a key. We also notice the similarity to the notion called security under chosen distribution attacks [4] that considers the security under a correlated leakage occurring from a message and randomness simultaneously (this is a security notion for PKE but can be considered for SKE as well), but this setting does not consider a leakage from a key or leakage with computational uninvertibility. It would be worth clarifying further whether it is possible to leverage techniques from these various kinds of "leakage resilient" cryptography for achieving AIND-δ-cPUAI/sPUAI secure MBPF obfuscators/SKE schemes.
where TDecap is a deterministic algorithm, (pk, sk) is a public/secret key pair, and c is a ciphertext of a session-key K ∈ {0, 1} k under pk and a "tag" tag. We require for all k ∈ N, all (pk, sk) output by TKG(1 k ), all tags tag, and all (c, K) ← TEncap(pk, tag), it holds that TDecap(sk, tag, c) = K.
We say that a TBKEM T is secure against selective-tag, weak chosen ciphertext attacks [54] (for short, wCCA secure) if for all PPTAs A = (A 0 , A 1 , A 2 ), Adv 
where A 1 and A 2 are not allowed to submit a tag/ciphertext pair (tag, c) satisfying tag = tag * to the oracle.
Universal One-Way Hash Function. We say that a pair of PPTAs H = (HKG, H) is a universal one-way hash function (UOWHF) if the following two properties are satisfied: (1) On input 1 k , HKG outputs a hash-key κ. For any hash-key κ output from HKG(1 k ), H defines an (efficiently computable) function of the form
is negligible, where the experiment is defined as follows:
Return 1 if and only if
Symmetric Key Encryption. A symmetric key encryption (SKE) scheme E consists of the two PPTAs (SEnc, SDec) with the following interface:
where SDec is a deterministic algorithm, c is a ciphertext of a plaintext m under a key K ∈ {0, 1} k , and k ∈ N is a security parameter. We require for all k ∈ N, all K ∈ {0, 1} k , and all plaintexts m, it holds that SDec(K, SEnc(K, m)) = m. We say that a SKE scheme E satisfies indistinguishability under one-time encryption (OT security, for short) if for all PPTAs A = (A 1 , A 2 ), Adv 
where it is required that |m 0 | = |m 1 |. We say that a SKE scheme E has the unique-key property [33, 44, 25] if there exists a negligible function ϵ such that for all keys K, K ′ ∈ {0, 1} k satisfying K ̸ = K ′ and all plaintexts m (in the plaintext space supported by E), it holds that
where the probability is over the randomness consumed by SEnc.
B Concrete Instantiations of Point/MBPF Obfuscators
Composable Point Obfuscator. Here we recall the point obfuscator due to Canetti, which was originally introduced as a perfectly one-way hash function [21] . Let G be a cyclic group with prime order p (where the size of p is determined by the security parameter k). Then, consider the following point obfuscator PO for PF(Z p ):
(where α ∈ Z p ) Pick a group element r ← G uniformly at random, and outputs the circuit C r,r α (·) : Z p → {⊤, ⊥}, where C A,B is the circuit which takes x ∈ Z p as input, and outputs ⊤ if A x = B and otherwise outputs ⊥.
Bitansky and Canetti [7] showed that the above point obfuscator is t-composable, under a strong variant of the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, called the t-strong vector DDH (t-SVDDH) assumption (see (see [7] for a formal definition).
We remark that as mentioned in [7] , the point obfuscator based on the t-SVDDH assumption described here satisfies the re-randomizability in the sense of Definition 8. Specifically, we can just re-randomize two group elements in an obfuscated circuit output from PO without changing the point address.
WVG Secure MBPF Obfuscator from Composable Point Obfuscator. We recall the construction of an MBPF obfuscator based on a composable point obfuscator, due to Canetti and Dakdouk [23] and Bitansky and Canetti [7] . Let PO be a point obfuscator for PF(X ) and let t = t(k) > 0 be a polynomial. Then an MBPF obfuscator MBPO for MBPF(X , t) is constructed as in Fig. 4 .
Based on the result of [23] , Bitansky and Canetti [7] showed that if PO is (t + 1)-composable, then the MBPF obfuscator MBPO constructed as in Fig. 4 is WVG secure. By instantiating this conversion with the above mentioned point obfuscator, we obtain a WVG secure t-bit-output MBPF obfuscator under the (t + 1)-SVDDH assumption. For  Return β ← (β1∥ . . . ∥βt) . Fig. 4 . The construction of an MBPF obfuscator MBPO from a composable point obfuscator PO [23, 7] . MBPO takes an MBPF I α→β as input, and returns a circuit DL = CP 0 ,...,Pt that is described in the right column. 
C k-Repetition Construction of PKE/Lossy Encryption and Its Security
In our proposed constructions, we will use the k-repetition construction of a PKE scheme and lossy encryption scheme, and thus we review them for self-containment of the paper. Let Π = (PKG, Enc, Dec) be a PKE scheme. Then the k-repetition PKE construction Fig. 5 . In case Π is a lossy encryption, we naturally define the lossy key generation algorithm LKG k for Π k based on LKG of Π. The security properties of the k-repetition construction are guaranteed by the following lemmas (which can be proved by applying a standard hybrid argument, and thus omitted).
Lemma 7.
If Π is a ϵ-CPA secure PKE scheme, then the k-repetition construction Π k based on Π is (kϵ)-CPA secure.
Lemma 8. If Π is a ϵ-lossy encryption scheme, then the k-repetition construction Π k based on Π is a (kϵ)-lossy encryption scheme.
D Postponed Proofs
D.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let δ : N → [0, 1] be any non-negligible function and t = t(k) ≥ 1 be a polynomial. Let MBPO be an MBPF obfuscator for MBPF(X , t) We show that for this δ and MBPO, there exist a PPTA A and a δ-sPUAI function ai such that Adv AIND-AI MBPO,ai,A (k) ≥ δ(k)/2, which means that MBPO is not AIND-δ-sPUAI secure, and hence will prove the lemma.
First, define the following probabilistic function ai:
It is straightforward to see that ai is a δ-sPUAI function. In particular, given z ← ai(α, β) for a randomly chosen (α, β), even a computationally unbounded adversary can output α with probability at most δ + 1/|X k |. Next, consider the following adversary A that runs in the experiment Expt
AIND-AI
MBPO,ai,A (k): Using the above, A's AIND-AI advantage can be calculated as follows:
where the last inequality is due to t ≥ 1. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
⊓ ⊔
D.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Let P K = ({pk
, κ) be a key pair output by KKG(1 k ), and let C = (c 1 , . . . , c k , DL) be a ciphertext output by . . . , c k ) . We show that for this C ′ , it holds that Decap(SK,
. Consider the following two cases:
Since DL is an obfuscation of an MBPF, when it is executed, the output value is not ⊥ if and only if the input is the point address. Thus, the fact that DL(α) = β ̸ = ⊥ must mean that DL is indeed an obfuscation of I α→β . However, recall that by the definition of Encap and the ciphertext C, we have that c i = Enc(pk We have shown that Decap(SK, C ′ ) = ⊥ holds for both cases. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
D.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Let 
, c 1 ) and α ℓ = Dec(sk (sk (h ℓ ) , c ℓ ) ). Let us consider the following two cases:
Case α 1 = α ℓ : Both Decap and AltDecap proceed identically after the fifth step, and thus the outputs from both algorithms must agree, regardless of the validity of C. Case α 1 ̸ = α ℓ : In this case, both Decap and AltDecap return ⊥. Specifically,
, and the correctness of the PKE scheme Π imply that there does not exist r ℓ such that Enc(pk (h ℓ ) ℓ , α 1 ; r ℓ ) = c ℓ , and thus Decap returns ⊥ when it performs the validity check of c ℓ by re-encryption at its last step at the latest (it could return ⊥ earlier if α 1 = ⊥ or DL(α 1 ) = ⊥). Symmetrically, there does not exist r 1 such that Enc(pk
, α ℓ ; r 1 ) = c 1 , and thus AltDecap returns ⊥ in its last step at the latest (it could return ⊥ earlier as above).
We have seen that Decap(SK, C) = AltDecap( SK h * , C) holds for all ciphertexts C = (c 1 , . . . , c k , DL) satisfying H κ (DL) ̸ = h * . This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
D.4 Proof of Lemma 5
As already mentioned, the implications from SAVB-X security to AVB-X security for both X ∈ {δ-cPUAI, δ-sPUAI}, and the implication from SAVG-δ-sPUAI security to AVG-δ-sPUAI security, are trivial by definition. Therefore, in the following we consider the opposite directions. Let MBPO be an MBPF obfuscator for MBPF(X , t) and let δ be a negligible function. We first show the implication from AVB-δ-cPUAI security to SAVB-δ-cPUAI security. Assume that MBPO is AVB-δ-cPUAI secure. Now, fix any PPTA adversary A against MBPO in the sense of SAVB-δ-cPUAI security, and also fix any positive polynomials q = q(k) and ℓ = ℓ(k). We will show that for these A, q and ℓ, there exists a PPTA simulator S such that for all ℓ-bounded δ-cPUAI functions ai and for all sufficiently large k ∈ N, it holds that Adv
Note that A can be viewed as an adversary in the sense of the AVB-δ-cPUAI security as well. Then, since MBPO is assumed to be AVB-δ-cPUAI secure, for this A and the polynomials 2q and ℓ, there exists a PPTA simulator S ′ (corresponding to A, 2q, and ℓ) such that for any ℓ-bounded δ-cPUAI function ai ′ and for all sufficiently large k ∈ N, it holds that
Now, using this S ′ , we construct a PPTA simulator S (corresponding to the above A, q, and ℓ) that does not use the oracle for the MBPF I α→β , as follows.
S(1 k , z):
(where z ← ai(α, β) and ai is any δ-cPUAI function) S runs S ′ (1 k , z) . S responds to all oracle queries from S ′ (to I α→β ) with ⊥. When S ′ terminates with output a bit b, S outputs this b and terminates.
Fix an arbitrary ℓ-bounded δ-cPUAI function ai. Let Bad be the event that S ′ makes a query α in the experiment Expt Sim ai,S ′ (k). By definition, unless S ′ issues the query that causes the event Bad, S perfectly simulates Expt Sim ai,S ′ (k) for S ′ , and S uses the output of S ′ . Therefore, we have | Pr[Expt
We show the following claim.
Claim 14 Pr[Bad] is negligible.
Proof of Claim 14. Let Q = Q(k) > 0 be the number of queries made by S ′ . (Since S ′ is a PPTA, Q is some polynomial.) We first show that there exists a PPTA F such that Adv
The description of F is as follows: where z ← ai(α, β) , and α and β are chosen uniformly at random) F runs S ′ (1 k , z) . F responds to all oracle queries from S ′ (1 k , z) (to I α→β ) with ⊥. When S ′ terminates, F picks one of the queries made by S ′ uniformly at random, outputs it as its guess for α, and terminates.
The above completes the description of F. It is easy to see that F perfectly simulates the experiment Expt Sim ai,S ′ (k) for S ′ until the point S ′ makes the query α. Therefore, the probability that S ′ makes the query α is exactly Pr [Bad] . Furthermore, once S ′ makes the query α, it is picked by F with probability at least 1/Q. Therefore, F's advantage can be calculated as follows:
Now, recall that ai is a δ-cPUAI function and δ is negligible. and thus for all sufficiently large
, and the right hand side is negligible. This completes the proof of Claim 14.
We have:
where the first inequality follows from the triangle inequality, the second inequality holds for all sufficiently large k ∈ N due to the inequalities (7), (8) and Claim 14, and the last inequality holds for all sufficiently large k ∈ N (because µ(k) ≤ 1 2q(k) holds for all sufficiently large k ∈ N). Recall that the choice of ai was arbitrarily, and thus the inequality (9) holds for any ℓ-bounded δ-cPUAI fuction ai.
Recall also that the choice of the PPTA adversary A and the positive polynomials q and ℓ was also arbitrarily, and thus the above works for any PPTA A and any positive polynomials q and ℓ. This means that MBPO is SAVB-δ-cPUAI secure.
The implication from AVB-δ-sPUAI security to SAVB-δ-sPUAI security can be proved identically to the above.
The proof for showing the implication from AVG-δ-sPUAI security to SAVG-δ-sPUAI security also proceeds in almost the same way, and thus we omit it. The difference is that the simulator S ′ due to AVG-δ-sPUAI security is computationally unbounded (and makes only polynomially many queries). Correspondingly, however, we only need to construct a computationally unbounded simulator S, to show the SAVG-δ-sPUAI security. Furthermore, the proof that S can simulate the experiment Expt Sim ai,S ′ (k) for all δ-sPUAI secure functions follows from the fact that S ′ makes only polynomially many queries and ai is statistically partially uninvertible, and thus we can similarly derive the upperbound of the probability Pr[Bad] to be negligible by constructing a computationally unbounded inverter F for ai. The rest of the analysis is exactly the same. This completes the proof of Lemma 5.
D.5 Proof of Lemma 6
Let δ be any negligible function, and let MBPO be an MBPF obfuscator for MBPF(X , t). Since the proof is essentially the same for both δ-cPUAI and δ-sPUAI cases, below we only show that SAVG-δ-cPUAI security implies AIND-δ-cPUAI security. Fix arbitrarily a PPTA adversary A and a δ-cPUAI function ai. We will show that Adv
AIND-AI
MBPO,ai,A (k) is negligible, namely, for any positive polynomial q and for all sufficiently large k ∈ N, it holds that Adv AIND-AI MBPO,ai,A (k) < 1/q(k). To this end, fix any positive polynomial q = q(k). Let ℓ = ℓ(k) be the maximum length of the output of ai when it takes an input from X k × {0, 1} t . Note that since ai is efficiently computable, ℓ must be some polynomial. Consider the following slightly modified probabilistic function ai
Note that when α and β are chosen uniformly at random, the distribution of z output from ai(α, β) and that from ai ′ (α, β) are identical. This directly implies that if ai is a δ-cPUAI function, then so is ai ′ . (And if ai is a δ-sPUAI function, then so is ai ′ .) Furthermore, it also implies that for any (even computationally unbounded) algorithm M, it holds that
Note also that by definition, both ai and ai ′ are ℓ-bounded. Now, due to our assumption that MBPO is SAVG-δ-cPUAI secure, for the adversary A and the polynomial 4q and the polynomial ℓ, there exists a computationally unbounded simulator S such that for the ℓ-bounded δ-cPUAI functions ai and ai ′ , and for all sufficiently large k ∈ N, the following two inequalities simultaneously hold:
and Adv
.
holds. Using this, the above two inequalities can be rewritten as follows:
where the probabilities (in the right hand side of the above equalities) are over the choice of α, β, and β ′ uniformly at random and also over the choice of randomness consumed by Obf, ai, A, and S. Now, we show that the adversary A's AIND-AI advantage (with respect to the probabilistic function ai) is smaller than 1/q(k). For all sufficiently large k ∈ N, it holds that
where the probabilities are over the random choice of α, β 0 , β 1 uniformly at random and also over the choice of randomness consumed by MBPO, ai, and A. In the above, the first inequality is due to the triangle inequality, and in the second inequality we used the inequality (11) (in which we regard β as β 0 ) and the inequality (12) (in which we regard β and β ′ as β 1 and β 0 , respectively).
Recall that the choice of the positive polynomial q was arbitrarily, and thus for all positive polynomials q we can show the inequation (13), which implies that Adv
Recall also that the choice of A and ai was also arbitrarily, and thus the above works for any PPTA A and any δ-cPUAI function ai. This completes the proof of Lemma 6.
D.6 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 is shown by using the equivalence of t-composability and t-distributional indistinguishability for coordinate-wise well-spread (CWS) distributions, established by Bitansky and Canetti [8] . First, we recall the notion of coordinate-wise well-spread distributions. 
Definition 9. ([8]) Let t = t(k) >
is negligible in k, where the probability is over the choice of
Then, we recall the definition of t-distributional indistinguishability for point obfuscators. 
Definition 10. ([8]) Let
Bitansky and Canetti [8] showed the following: Proof of Theorem 3. Let PO be the point obfuscator for PF(X ) used as a building block of Π. We first show that an ordinary public key output by PKG(1 k ) and a lossy public key output by LKG(1 k ) are indistinguishable. Let A be any PPTA distinguisher that tries to distinguish an ordinary public key and a lossy public key of the scheme Π. Define the following three distribution ensembles Φ (1) 
(where the probabilities are also over the randomness consumed by PO and A.) Note that the statistical distance between Φ
k and Φ (2) k is negligible, and thus the first term in the inequality (14) is negligible. Furthermore, our assumption that PO is 2-composable, combined with Lemma 9, implies that PO satisfies 2-distributional indistinguishability. This, combined with fact that Φ (3) is 2-CWS, in turn implies that the second term in the inequality (14) is negligible. (Otherwise, we can construct a PPTA distinguisher that violates 2-distributional indistinguishability of PO with regard to Φ (3) .) In summary, Π satisfies the indistinguishability of ordinary/lossy public keys.
The fact that Π satisfies the statistical lossiness is straightforward to see. A lossy public key output by LKG(1 k ) is of the form pk = ( P 0 , P 1 ) = (PO(I α ), PO(I α )) for a randomly chosen α ∈ X k , and thus for any plaintext m ∈ {0, 1} t , its encryption is of the form C = (c 1 , . . . , c t ) where every c i is computed as c i ← ReRand(PO(I α )), and thus the distribution of a ciphertext is identical for all plaintexts. (This remains true even when the distribution of public keys is also taken into account.) This implies that even a computationally unbounded adversary A has advantage zero in the experiment Expt LOS-CPA Π,A (k). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
E Non-adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Security via MBPF Obfuscation
In this section, we show a simpler CCA1 secure variant of our proposed KEMs that we showed in Section 4. Interestingly, the relation between the KEM Γ ′ shown in this section and our first
construction Γ in Section 4 is similar to the relation between the Naor-Yung PKE construction [63] and the Dolev-Dwork-Naor PKE construction [35] . Let Π = (PKG, Enc, Dec) be a PKE scheme with the plaintext space {0, 1} k and the randomness length ℓ R (k). We define t(k) = 2ℓ R (k) + k. Let X = {X k } k∈N be a domain ensemble such that each element in X k is of length k, and let MBPO be an MBPF obfuscator for MBPF(X , t). Then we construct a KEM Γ ′ = (KKG ′ , Encap ′ , Decap ′ ) as in Fig. 6 . As in the case of the CCA2 secure KEM Γ given in Section 4, the following "alternative" decapsulation algorithm AltDecap ′ is useful for showing the security of Γ ′ : For a key pair (P K, SK = (sk 1 , sk 2 )) output by KKG ′ (1 k ), we define the "alternative" secret key SK by SK = (P K, sk 2 ). Regarding AltDecap ′ , the following is easy to see due to the symmetric role of sk 1 and sk 2 , and the validity check of c 1 and c 2 performed at the last step. (The proof is essentially the same as that of Lemma 3, and thus omitted.) Lemma 10. Let (P K, SK = (sk 1 , sk 2 )) be a key pair output by KKG ′ (1 k ), and let SK = (P K, sk 2 ) be the alternative secret key as defined above. Then, for any ciphertext C (which could be outside the range of Encap
Now, we show the CCA1 security of Γ ′ as follows.
Theorem 5.
Assume that Π is ϵ-CPA secure with negligible ϵ and MBPO is AIND-δ-cPUAI secure with δ(k) ≥ 2ϵ(k). Then, the KEM Γ ′ constructed as in Fig. 6 is CCA1 secure.
Proof of Theorem 5. We will show that for any PPTA adverasry A attacking the CCA1 security of the KEM Γ ′ , there exist PPTA B o and a (kϵ)-cPUAI function ai
This inequality, combined with our assumptions on the building blocks, implies that Adv , and the value K * that is used as K * 1 ), are generated/chosen in exactly the same way as those in Game 1. In particular, A 1 is run during the calculation of ai Γ ′ , but it is given a correctly generated public key P K = (pk 1 , pk 2 ) as input, and A 1 's decapsulation queries C are answered with Decap ′ (SK, C), as is done in Game 1, and thus the state information st is generated in exactly the same way as that in Game 1. Furthermore, since γ is chosen randomly by B o , the challenge ciphertext C * = (c * 1 , c * 2 , DL * ) and the challenge session-key K * γ that are input into A 2 are also generated in exactly the same way as those in Game 1 in which the challenge bit is γ. Since B o inputs (st, C * , K * γ ) to A 2 , B o simulates Game 1 perfectly for A 2 in which the challenge bit for A is γ. Under this situation, the probability that γ ′ = γ occurs is exactly the same as the probability that A succeeds in guessing its challenge bit in Game 1, i.e.
Next, consider the case when b = 1, i.e. DL * is computed as DL * ← MBPO(I α→β 1 ), where β 1 is also chosen uniformly at random, independently of β 0 . Under this situation, if we regard α, β 0 , and β 1 in Expt AIND-AI MBPO,ai Γ ′ ,Bo (k) as α * , β * , and β ′ in Game 2, respectively, then the challenge ciphertext/session-key pair (C * , K * γ ) is generated in such a way that it is distributed identically to that in Game 2, and thus B o simulates Game 2 perfectly for A in which the challenge bit for A is γ. Therefore, with a similar argument to the above, we have Pr
In the following we show the upperbound of the terms that appear in the right hand side of the above inequality. 
Consider the case when b = 0, i.e. c * is an encryption of M 0 = α. It is easy to see that in this case, B p simulates Expt P-Inv ai 1 ,F (k) perfectly for F. In particular, in the real experiment Expt P-Inv ai 1 ,F (k), c * 1 and c * 2 are computed using randomness r * 1 and r * 2 that are contained in β ∈ {0, 1} t , which are chosen uniformly at random, and c * 1 and c * 2 generated in B p 's CPA experiment are also generated by using the randomness which are identically distributed (the randomness for c * 1 is chosen by B p and the randomness for c * 2 is chosen by B p 's CPA experiment). Under this situation, the probability that α ′ = α occurs is identical to the probability that F succeeds in outputting α in Expt
On the other hand, it is also easy to see that when b = 1 (i.e. c * is an encryption of In this section, we discuss several issues on replacing an MBPF obfuscator with a SKE scheme in our proposed constructions of KEMs.
Motivation. As has been clarified in several previous works [23, 33, 44, 25] , there is a strong connection between MBPF obfuscators and SKE schemes. More specifically, an obfuscation of an MBPF I K→m can be considered as an encryption of a plaintext m using a key K. In order for the converse direction to hold, i.e. viewing an encryption of a plaintext m under a key K (together with a decryption algorithm) as an obfuscation of the MBPF I K→m , the SKE scheme needs to satisfy a property that the decryption algorithm using a key K outputs ⊥ when it is input a ciphertext generated by using a different key K ′ ̸ = K. This property is referred to as the unique-key property 5 [33, 44, 25] (we recall the definition in Appendix A). Given a SKE scheme that has the unique-key property and satisfies the security that we call AIND-δ-cPUAI security and AIND-δ-sPUAI security, which are defined in essentially the same way as those for MBPF obfuscators, then we can replace the MBPF obfuscator in our proposed KEM Γ in Section 4 with the SKE scheme. (Interestingly, the unique-key property is not needed for our CCA1 secure construction given in Appendix E, and thus we can replace the MBPF obfuscator with a SKE without the unique-key property.)
Although it was shown in [25] how to convert any SKE scheme into one that supports the unique-key property by using a family of pairwise-independent hash functions, we could not figure out whether this conversion preserves AIND-δ-cPUAI security and AIND-δ-sPUAI security in general. (We conjecture that it does not.) Therefore, we think that in general AIND-δ-cPUAI secure (and AIND-δ-sPUAI secure) SKE schemes without the unique-key property are potentially easier to construct than MBPF obfuscators with the same security. This is the main reason why we focus on replacing an MBPF obfuscator with a SKE scheme in our proposed constructions. In the following we will show that the unique-key property is not a necessary property for constructing CCA2 secure KEMs by using a SKE scheme, via a tag-based KEM (TBKEM for short, whose formal definition can be found in Appendix A) together with the TBKEM-to-PKE/KEM transformation due to [54] .
Organization of This Section. The rest of this section is organized as follows: In Appendix F.1, we formalize the AIND-δ-cPUAI security and the AIND-δ-sPUAI security for SKE, and we also recall the transformation of an MBPF obfuscator into a SKE scheme. In Appendix F.2, we show that the proposed KEM using a SKE scheme can be modified to a wCCA secure TBKEM, and show that the security of this TBKEM can be proved without relying on the unique-key property of the used SKE scheme. Finally, in Appendix F.3, we show an evidence that achieving AIND-δ-cPUAI and AIND-δ-sPUAI secure SKE schemes is not so trivial, by clarifying an implication of these security definitions to a kind of leakage-resilience security that takes into account leakage only from a key (as opposed to leakage simultaneously from a key and a random plaintext being encrypted).
F.1 Average-Case Indistinguishability with Auxiliary Input for SKE
We formalize the security notion that we need for a SKE scheme here. 
From MBPF Obfuscator to SKE. Here, we recall the transformation of an MBPF obfuscator into a SKE scheme [23, 25] . Let MBPO be an MBPF obfuscator for MBPF({0, 1} * , t). From MBPO, we construct a SKE scheme E = (SEnc, SDec) as follows: The following is obvious from the definition.
Lemma 11.
If the MBPF obfuscator MBPO is AIND-δ-cPUAI (resp. AIND-δ-sPUAI) secure, then the SKE scheme E constructed as above is AIND-δ-cPUAI (resp. AIND-δ-sPUAI) secure and furthermore has the unique-key property.
F.2 wCCA Secure TBKEM via SKE
As we explained in Section 7 and at the beginning of Appendix F, if we replace the MBPF obfuscator in our proposed KEMs in Section 4 with a SKE scheme, then the SKE scheme needs to satisfy unique-key property. (However, for our CCA1 secure KEM in Appendix E, we do not need it.) Here, we show that we can construct a CCA2 secure PKE scheme/KEM without relying on the unique-key property. This can be accomplished by first constructing a wCCA secure TBKEM and then converting it into a CCA2 secure PKE/KEM using the existing methods [30, 24, 54 ] using a one-time signature (or a combination of a commitment and a message authentication code [13] ).
Our construction of a TBKEM is a simple modification of the KEM Γ given in Section 4. Other than using a SKE scheme instead of an MBPF obfuscator, the difference between the proposed TBKEM and the KEM Γ is that we use a tag that is input to the encapsulation algorithm of a TBKEM as a "selector" of public keys {pk
Formally, the construction of the TBKEM is as follows: Let Π = (PKG, Enc, Dec) be a PKE scheme with the plaintext space {0, 1} k and the randomness length ℓ R (k). We define t(k) = k · ℓ R (k) + k. Let E = (SEnc, SDec) be a SKE schemes with the plaintext space {0, 1} t . Then we construct a TBKEM T = (TKG, TEncap, TDecap) as in Fig. 7 . (We assume that the tag space of T is {0, 1} k when used with the security parameter 1 k .)
The security of T is guaranteed by the following theorems. As in the proposed KEM Γ in Section 4, wCCA security of T can be shown in two ways.
Theorem 6.
Assume that Π is ϵ-CPA secure with negligible ϵ, and E is AIND-δ-cPUAI secure with δ(k) ≥ kϵ(k). Then, the TBKEM T constructed as in Fig. 7 is wCCA secure.
Theorem 7.
Assume that Π is an ϵ-lossy encryption scheme with negligible ϵ, and E is AIND-δ-sPUAI secure with δ(k) ≥ kϵ(k). Then, the TBKEM T constructed as in Fig. 7 is wCCA secure.
Parse SK as {sk
, α; ri) = ci then return K else return ⊥ Fig. 7 . The proposed wCCA secure TBKEM T using SKE (possibly without the unique-key property).
The proofs of Theorems 6 and 7 are almost identical to those of Theorems 1 and 2, and thus we only provide a proof sketch of the former theorem.
Let A = (A 0 , A 1 , A 2 ) be any PPTA wCCA adversary. Consider the following sequence of games. where AltTDecap is the alternative decapsulation algorithm that is defined similarly to AltDecap for the KEM Γ given in Section 4 and SK tag * is the alternative secret key, which is defined similarly to that for AltDecap, corresponding to (P K, SK) and the k-bit string tag * which is the challenge tag submitted by A 0 . Game 3: Same as Game 2, except that c * is replaced with an encryption of an independently chosen random value β ′ ∈ {0, 1} t . That is, the step " c * ← SEnc(α * , β * )" is replaced with the steps "β ′ ← {0, 1} t ; c * ← SEnc(α * , β ′ )."
Game 1: This is the experiment Expt
For i ∈ [3] , let Succ i be the event that A succeeds in guessing the challenge bit in Game i. We can show that Pr[Succ 1 ] = Pr[Succ 2 ], because TDecap(SK, tag, C) = AltTDecap( SK tag * , tag, C) holds for all tag/ciphertext pairs (tag, C) satisfying tag ̸ = tag * and thus the oracle given to A in Game 1 and that in Game 2 behave identically for all queries from A.
We can show | Pr[Succ 2 ] − Pr[Succ 3 ]| to be negligible using the AIND-δ-cPUAI security of E and the ϵ-CPA security of Π. In showing this, we consider an auxiliary input function that is exactly the same as ai Γ we used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Finally, Pr[Succ 3 ] = 1/2 because A's view is independent of the challenge bit. (More specifically, K * 1 and K * 0 are both chosen uniformly from {0, 1} k and independent of the challenge ciphertext C * (and any other values that are available for A in Game 3), and thus the challenge session-key is distributed identically regardless of the challenge bit.) F.3 On the Non-triviality for Achieving AIND-δ-cPUAI and AIND-δ-sPUAI Security
In this subsection, we show an evidence that constructing an AIND-δ-cPUAI (and AIND-δ-sPUAI) secure SKE scheme is at least as difficult as constructing a SKE scheme which satisfies one-time security in the presence of hard-to-invert auxiliary input that captures the leakage only from a key (which has been considered in several papers [33, 44, 25] ). This is done by showing that it is possible to construct a SKE scheme satisfying the latter security from a SKE scheme satisfying the former security.
We first define the latter security notion for a SKE scheme. To this end, we need to define an appropriate auxiliary input function that captures a leakage from a key, which we simply call an uninvertible auxiliary input function.
Definition 12.
Let ai : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} * be a (possibly probabilistic) function. We say that ai is a δ-computationally (resp. δ-statistically) uninvertible auxiliary input function (δ-cUAI (resp. δ-sUAI) function, for short), if (1) it is efficiently computable, and (2) for every PPTA (resp. computationally unbounded algorithm) F and for all sufficiently large k ∈ N, it holds that Adv 
We then define the one-time security in the presence of uninvertible auxiliary input.
Definition 13.
We say that a SKE scheme E = (SEnc, SDec) satisfies indistinguishability under one-time encryption in the presence of δ-computationally (resp. δ-statistically) uninvertible auxiliary input (OT-δ-cUAI (resp. OT-δ-sUAI) secure, for short) if for all PPTAs A = (A 1 , A 2 ) and all δ-cUAI (resp. δ-sUAI) functions ai, the advantage function Adv Relations to the Existing Definitions. Our definition of OT-δ-cUAI security is the "one-time encryption" version of [33, Definition 4.1] . (Actually, [33] only considers exponentially computationally uninvertible functions as auxiliary input functions). Furthermore, our definition of OT-δ-cUAI/OT-δ-sUAI security is similar to the "semantic security with weak keys and auxiliary inputs" in [26, Def. 4.1], but is weaker in two aspects. First, our definition only considers keys that are chosen uniformly at random, while the definition in [26] treats "weak keys" that are only guaranteed to have some sufficiently high min-entropy. Second, our definition only requires ordinary indistinguishability (of an encryption of two challenge plaintexts), while the definition in [26] requires the existence of a universal simulator that can generate a ciphertext that is indistinguishable from an honestly generated ciphertext for any adversarially chosen plaintext (the simulator needs to be universal in the sense that it needs to work for all PPTA adversaries).
Constructing OT-δ-cUAI and OT-δ-sUAI Secure SKE Schemes. Let E = (SEnc, SDec) and E ′ = (SEnc ′ , SDec ′ ) be SKE schemes, where we assume that the plaintext space of E and that of E ′ are {0, 1} k and {0, 1} t (where t = t(k) > 0 is a polynomial), respectively. Then we construct another SKE scheme E = ( SEnc, SDec) with the plaintext space {0, 1} t as in Fig. 8 .
The following shows that constructing an AIND-δ-cPUAI (resp. AIND-δ-sPUAI) secure SKE scheme is at least as difficult as constructing an OT-δ-cUAI (resp. OT-δ-sUAI) secure one.
Theorem 8.
If the SKE scheme E is AIND-δ-cPUAI (resp. AIND-δ-sPUAI) secure and the SKE scheme E ′ is OT secure, then the SKE scheme E constructed as in Fig. 8 is OT-δ-cUAI (resp. OT-δ-sUAI) secure.
Parse C as (c1, c2) R ← SDec(K, c1) If R = ⊥ then return ⊥ Return m ← SDec ′ (R, c2) Fig. 8 . The construction of an OT-δ-cUAI (resp. OT-δ-sUAI) secure SKE scheme E from an AIND-δ-cPUAI (resp. AIND-δ-sPUAI) secure SKE scheme E and an OT secure SKE scheme E ′ .
Proof of Theorem 8. The security proofs for the both cUAI and sUAI cases are essentially the same, and thus we only show the former case. We will show that for any PPTA adversary A attacking the OT-δ-cUAI security of the SKE scheme E and any δ-cUAI function ai, there exist PPTAs B and B ′ and a δ-cPUAI function ai such that Adv
which, combined with the assumptions on E and E ′ , implies that Adv 
Therefore, it remains to upperbound the right hand side of the above inequality. We first would like to show the upperbound of | Pr[Succ 1 ] − Pr[Succ 2 ]|, using the AIND-δ-cPUAI security of E. To this end, we first specify the δ-cPUAI function ai : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} k → {0, 1} * as follows:
ai(K, R): On input K, R ∈ {0, 1} k , compute z ′ ← ai(K) and output z ← (z ′ , R).
It is straightforward to see that the above function is a δ-cPUAI function, because ai is a δ-cUAI function and R is independent of z ′ . In fact, it is easy to construct an inverter for ai, given an inverter for ai. Furthermore, here, it is also easy to see that if ai is a δ-sUAI function, then ai is a δ-sPUAI function. Now, we proceed to showing the upperbound of the right hand side of the inequality (19).
Claim 18
There exists a PPTA B such that Adv Fig. 9 . The MBPF obfuscator MBPO R in the random oracle model in [57] . MBPO R takes an MBPF I α→β as input, and returns a circuit DL R = C R r,X,Y (·) that is described in the right column.
G AIND-δ-cPUAI Secure MBPF Obfuscator in the Random Oracle Model
Here, we recall the MBPF obfuscator by Lynn, Prabhakaran, and Sahai [57] that uses a random oracle, and show that it can be shown to be AIND-δ-cPUAI secure (for any negligible function δ) in the random oracle model. (We note that in the random oracle model, not only an MBPF obfuscator, an obfuscated circuit, and an adversary, but also the corresponding δ-cPUAI function is allowed to access to the random oracle.) Let t = t(k) > 0 be a polynomial and let R : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} 2k+t be a random oracle. Then, the MBPF obfuscator MBPO R in [57] for MBPF({0, 1} * , t) is as in Fig. 9 . We note that this construction only satisfies the approximate functionality. That is, with a negligible probability (over the choice of the random oracle R), MBPO R (I α→β ) can output an obfuscated circuit DL for which there exists a value α ′ ̸ = α such that DL(α ′ ) ̸ = ⊥. However, such approximate functionality is sufficient for our purpose in this paper. (Additionally, when viewed as a SKE scheme, it satisfies the unique-key property.)
The security can be shown as follows.
Theorem 9.
The MBPF obfuscator MBPO R constructed as in Fig. 9 is AIND-δ-cPUAI secure for any negligible function δ in the random oracle model where R is modeled as a random oracle.
Proof of Theorem 9. Let A be any PPTA adversary and let ai : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} t → {0, 1} * be any δ-cPUAI function where δ is a negligible function, and let R be a random oracle. Suppose A and ai make at most q A and q ai queries, respectively. (Note that since A and ai are PPTAs, q A and q ai are polynomials.) Recall that in the experiment, A is given an auxiliary input z ← ai R (α, β 0 ) and an obfuscated circuit DL R = C R r,X,Y (·) ← MBPO R (I α→β b ) where R(r∥α) = (X∥K) and Y = (K ⊕ β b ), is given oracle access to the random oracle R, and has to guess the challenge bit b.
Firstly, note that the probability that ai R (α, β 0 ) makes the query (r∥α) is negligible (actually it is at most q ai /2 k ), because r is independent of the view of ai and r is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} k .
Secondly, conditioned on the event that ai has not made the query (r∥α), it is easy to see that the probability that A(z, DL) submits the query (r∥α) is negligible due to the partial uninvertibility of ai. More specifically, the probability can be shown to be at most q A · (δ + 1/2 k ) + q ai /2 k . (If this does not hold, then one can construct an inverter for ai that is given z ← ai R (α, β), uses A as a building block and succeeds in outputting α with the advantage greater than δ.)
Finally, conditioned on the event that neither ai nor A made the query (r∥α), K looks like a uniformly random string over {0, 1} t , and the information on the challenge bit b is informationtheoretically hidden from A, because R is a random oracle.
Therefore, by the union bound over the undesirable events that ai or A makes the query (r∥α), we can conclude that A has at most negligible advantage. This completes the proof of Theorem 9.
